All local health departments struggle with the question of how best to enhance public health preparedness with limited time and resources. The article by Paige et al. describes a local initiative that yielded improved awareness and readiness for some aspects of emergency response, and a realistic assessment of increased uncertainty for other, more complex and policy-level aspects. Paige and colleagues are to be commended for carefully evaluating the impacts of mounting a wide-scale, staged exercise to assess readiness to implement the local Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. Participants were observed to gain quick familiarity with the operational, logistical aspects of response, but they also learned how decision-making rapidly involves substantial and complex policy issues that range across jurisdictions. Direct observation of preparedness processes in large drills is an increasingly effective tool for public health preparedness.
Local public health departments routinely conduct exercises to assess plans, improve skills, and identify gaps in preparedness and response performance. The emergence of new influenza A virus subtypes, such as H1N1, requires public health agencies to incorporate health-care organizations and other partners into their operating plans and conduct exercises to help ensure that communities can maintain critical functions. There is considerable variability in how exercises are designed and conducted as well as a need for a stronger evidence base on best practices. 1 This article shows how a local public health agency and its community partners evolved in the planning, use, and evaluation of a series of exercises for pandemic influenza preparedness. bACKground The Regional Disaster Plan for Public and Private Organizations in King County, Washington, is a framework for regional all-hazards policy and operational disaster responses. 2 The Emergency Support Function-8 (ESF-8): Public Health and Medical Services is part of the Regional Disaster Plan. ESF-8 defines the concept of operations for health, medical, and mortuary response across King County and delineates the responsibilities of Public Health-Seattle & King County (PHSKC) and regional health-care partners. 3 In 2005, PHSKC developed the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan as an annex to ESF-8. 4 The Pandemic Influenza Response Plan outlines PHSKC's tasks in the event of an influenza pandemic and provides the health-care community and other key partners with information to guide their pandemic influenza preparedness efforts. According to ESF-8, in a pandemic influenza outbreak PHSKC oversees the implementation of social-distancing and community-containment measures, medical logistics and health messaging, and the delivery and administration of prophylaxis and treatment. PHSKC is also responsible for surveillance and outbreak detection. Key community partners are expected to work alongside PHSKC to provide care and support for individuals affected by the outbreak, as well as to maintain continuity of operations.
While the development of plans is crucial for an efficient, effective, and equitable response in an event, a plan is only useful if all parties are aware of it, accept their defined roles, and have the capacity to carry out designated responsibilities. Once a plan is developed and partnerships are established, the plan must be communicated and exercised, training should occur, and the effectiveness of the plan must be tested and evaluated through an exercise program. This article describes the implementation and evaluation of a series of PHSKC-led exercises to test the county's Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, and highlights the lessons learned from this experience.
initiAtive SummAry
In 2006, PHSKC convened design teams to plan a series of four integrated exercises. The goals of the exercises were to enhance community collaboration, identify gaps in the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, and improve preparedness. 5 This exercise series was also intended to clarify key preparedness tasks as outlined in the plan, specifically decision triggers and the chain of authority. An unfolding pandemic influenza scenario was created and had common elements across the four exercises: Specific messages and questions were developed to guide participants through scenarios and prompt responses. For each exercise, four types of participants were involved: players, content experts, observers, and evaluators. Players included people responsible for implementing the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan from public health, health-care delivery, emergency management, public safety, and community organizations. The specific types of participants and organizations represented varied according to the exercise, but included elected officials, PHSKC section managers and directors, the fire department, the police department, emergency management, emergency medical services, state and federal public health officials, large employers, university personnel, and representatives from health-care delivery organizations and public utilities. Across the four exercises, there were a total of 86 players, 87 observers and content experts, and 15 evaluators.
To evaluate the exercises, players completed pre-and post-exercise questionnaires designed to assess changes in levels of confidence related to specific pandemic influenza response knowledge and skills. The survey instrument was created using a framework that was developed in 1952 and continues to be widely used today. 6 The model includes four levels of measurement to assess reaction, learning, behavior, and results as related to specific training. Self-reported confidence was used as an indicator of a participant's ability or capacity to understand and accomplish an articulated goal. Studies measuring self-reported confidence levels in the workplace found that behavior in the workplace was not only a function of knowledge, but also of how certain the employee was of that knowledge. 7 Such evaluations have been used in infectious disease planning scenarios. 8 The evaluation plan included qualitative data collection during the exercises and a follow-up survey. During the exercises and the debrief sessions, qualitative data were collected through checklists and feedback forms used by observers and evaluators. A Web-based six-month follow-up survey was distributed to players to determine the longevity of the exercises in instilling the importance of pandemic influenza planning and to assess if the exercises prompted pandemic influenza response preparedness planning.
All responses to open-ended questions on the post-questionnaires, checklists, and feedback forms were aggregated and summarized; themes were identified across all exercises and for individual exercises.
outCome And evALuAtion

Findings from evaluation of individual exercises
The goal of the Communicable Disease Surveillance Tabletop was to test surveillance and case-reporting processes and procedures between PHSKC's Epidemiology and Communicable Disease Control section and the health-care community. Responses to the players' pre-and post-exercise questionnaires showed a significant increase in the respondents' understanding of the reporting, communicating, and messaging processes, which suggests a boost in participants' familiarity and acceptance of the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan (Table 1) . After the exercise, observers noted several strengths in the process; most pronounced were the collaborative relationships and advanced planning that had already been established to support the process. Observers stated that more effort was needed to ensure consistent and accurate communication to the public and key partners. They also noted a need for more clarity on the governance and decision-making structure around surveillance and case reporting. Evaluators identified the key areas for improvement as communication, staff retention, and procedure clarification.
The PICC Exercise was the only exercise incorporating a functional drill, which required that participants actually field telephone calls. Players' understanding of operational guidance and resources and confidence in their ability to handle a large volume of calls increased significantly immediately following the exercise (Table 1 ). Observers noted that the exercise was a realistic test of how the existing systems could manage a high volume and constant influx of telephone calls. The exercise demonstrated that there were some equipment issues that caused problems handling call volume. Observer and evaluator recommendations included addressing the identified equipment issues as well as creating a more efficient way for operators to contact support staff for assistance and more easily access reference information in the manual.
The goal of the Leadership and Decision-Making Tabletop was to test protocols for implementing social-distancing and community-containment strategies during a pandemic. Trends in player confidence concerning social-distancing and containment protocols increased, but those changes were not statistically significant, possibly because rates were already high or because the exercise also illuminated gaps in leadership response capacities. Observers noted that strengths included the existing relationships between organizations and the integrative planning efforts. Observers also reported that stakeholders had a solid understanding of and commitment to pandemic influenza preparedness. However, they identified many inconsistencies, including perceptions of procedures; legal issues surrounding social distancing; communication processes; role of the media, schools, and workplaces; and the decision-making structure. Observers recommended that the players, along with other key stakeholders, continue discussions about not only responding to but also recovering from a pandemic influenza event. Evaluators noted that the objectives for the exercise were met; however, they also reinforced the observers' comments about gaps in the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan.
The Health System Surge Capacity & Resource Management Tabletop was designed to test the King County health-care community's capability to address capacity and resource challenges, including prioritization of critical care. Of interest, there was a decline in players' confidence in all of the items assessed, with the largest decline in the players' confidence in their ability to mobilize existing and alternative transport for patients requiring hospitalization (Table 1) . Observers stated that one of the strengths of this exercise was the willingness of partners to work together to develop plans for an integrated response. However, many more gaps were identified than in the other exercises. Observers noted that issues still needed to be addressed, including human resources capacities, outreach to vulnerable populations, appropriate standards of care, and planning for alternative care sites. There was concern that medical facilities would not be able to care for regular medical patients during a pandemic and that the medical system would be overwhelmed.
Findings from six-month follow-up survey
The response rate was 50% for the six-month follow-up survey (n534). Table 2 shows activities that occurred in respondent organizations since their participation in the pandemic influenza exercise. Activities included establishing policies, clarifying decisionmaking channels, increasing understanding of roles and responsibilities, planning for availability of and access to needed resources (including staff and supplies), increasing communication and coordination with emergency management partners, and launching sensitization efforts on the need for public messaging/ information. When asked to highlight one of the key activities that their organization had undertaken since the exercise series was completed, respondents identified a range of efforts, including identification of critical services and staff chain of command; holding their own internal tabletop to identify and target their in-house issues; and preparing written pandemic influenza plans within their own organizations. Respondents were also asked to report any additional activities planned for the future to help prepare a pandemic influenza response (data available upon request). The vast majority (93%) of the respondents to the six-month survey expressed interest in participating in future exercises to build upon this exercise series. The priority for future exercises, identified by respondents, was in the area of health system surge capacity and resource management (71% of respondents).
diSCuSSion
The information obtained from the exercise evaluations was useful for refining the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan and advancing interagency coordination, communication, and planning initiatives. Participation in the exercises was associated with several increases, as well as some declines in confidence levels following exercises. We believe that the latter finding is a result of the participants' greater awareness of the complexities inherent in responding to an influenza pandemic. Results from the six-month follow-up survey identified pandemic influenza planning activities by those respondents who participated in the exercises. Activities occurring with the highest frequency, such as establishing pandemic influenza response policies and procedures, reflect the general objectives of the exercise series.
Limitations and strengths
There were several limitations to our evaluation of this series of exercises. The 50% response rate for the six-month assessment may have introduced response bias. Because the surveys were anonymous, there was no opportunity to characterize the nonrespondents or link respondents with their earlier surveys, which would have helped to control for likely bias in the follow-up survey. In contrast, the pre-and post-exercise questionnaires had a much higher response rate because they were administered to players as they entered the room to begin the exercise and again before they exited the room at the end of the exercise. The exercise series and its evaluation also had a number of strengths. Involving such a large number of participants and community partners in preparedness exercises was made possible by sequentially staging this customized series of four exercises that examined different elements of the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. Previously, PHSKC would select a major response plan or disaster scenario and conduct a single two-hour tabletop exercise to address several major, albeit disconnected, response issues. This previous approach served more to identify problems than to assess the effectiveness of planning efforts. With this new approach, using a coordinated series of exercises, the disaster scenario and response plans were divided into modules and then tested in sequence during a period of several weeks.
The sequencing was designed to mimic a pandemic wave, starting with epidemiologic surveillance, then decision-making on social distancing, then public information, and finally to health-care system response to a surge. This new approach allowed PHSKC to focus on roles and responsibilities and assess decisions and planning assumptions under many different circumstances. PHSKC then built upon this series of exercises by adopting a similar approach to its subsequent fourday pandemic influenza full-scale exercise conducted in November 2008. Additionally, this exercise model required players to adapt from one exercise to the next without the benefit of rewriting plans and retrainingsimilar to how one has to adapt during real events. They would bring lessons learned from one event and apply them in the next exercise, mostly through problem-solving and verbal coordination during the exercise. This real-time environment demonstrated the social processes involved in emergency response and allowed PHSKC to adapt subsequent training and drills to reflect participant experiences.
Additionally, the 2006 exercises were instrumental in implementing the current response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak. For example, they fostered direct connections with the University of Washington on community containment, disease reporting, and vaccine distribution plans-most of which are currently being implemented on campus. The exercises also provided valuable insight into how information from PHSKC (e.g., disease rates and severity, public health response actions, and public education messages) should be communicated to key partners such as elected officials, health-care partners, and emergency managers, all of whom were represented in these exercises. The exer-cises clarified roles and capabilities for a widespread field response to a public health hazard (i.e., mass vaccination campaign and distribution of stockpiled antiviral medications, which was underway in early 2010). Overall, these exercises provided PHSKC with a better understanding of how to effectively use other health-care partners to implement plans for providing preventive and treatment interventions to large numbers of patients in a short period of time.
Since the completion of the exercise series, PHSKC has also made adjustments to how it plans, implements, and evaluates trainings and exercises. All trainings and exercises now focus on testing predetermined capabilities, such as the Department of Homeland Security Target Capabilities List. 9 This enables PHSKC to identify optimum performance; develop work plans and response plans around specific, measurable capabilities; and assess exercise performance and the viability of response plans based on the identified capabilities. The shift in planning methodology has resulted in tabletops and functional exercises that are more aligned with these capabilities. Once a response exercise is conducted, the lessons learned are incorporated into an After Action Report and Improvement Plan, which leads to revised plans and training curricula, which are tested again at a later date. A product of this exercise series was PHSKC's contribution of this material, as a National Association of County & City Health Officials (NACCHO) Advanced Practice Center, to the development of a pandemic influenza toolkit by NACCHO in 2007. 10 This guide, which included a tabletop exercise and evaluation template, was made widely available for use by other health departments to assist in planning and conducting their own exercises.
ConCLuSion
These exercises resulted in an increased understanding of the response process among community partners. Additionally, players reported bringing lessons back to their agencies and working to articulate and strengthen their response plans. The exercise series influenced PHSKC's process for planning such exercises and allowed it to make a number of improvements internally, as well as contribute lessons and materials to the field. The information and experiences shared herein should be useful to other local public health agencies working to ensure community resilience in the face of a pandemic.
